The aim of this paper is to provide a reduced Routley-Meyer semantics for the logics characterized by all natural implicative expansions of Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix (with two designated values, as well as with only one) susceptible to be interpreted in Routley-Meyer semantics.
Introduction
Given a matrix semantics, a conditional is natural if it fulfills the three following conditions: (1) it coincides with the classical conditional when restricted to the classical values  and  ; (2) it satisfies the Modus Ponens; and (3) it is assigned a designated value when the value assigned to its antecedent is less than or equal to the value assigned to its consequent (cf. [18] ). In [14] and [15] , it is presented a "bivalent" Belnap-Dunn semantics (cf. [3] , [4] , [7] and [8] ) for all natural implicative expansions of Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix (cf. [10] ) with two designated values (cf. [14] ) as well as with only one designated value (cf. [15] ). Well then, the aim of this paper is to provide a Routley-Meyer semantics for the logics characterized by all natural implicative expansions of Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix (with both only one and also two designated values) susceptible to be interpreted in this type of semantics.
Routley-Meyer type ternary relational semantics (RM-semantics) was introduced in the early 70s of the past century (cf. [5] , [16] and references therein). It was particularly defined for interpreting relevance logics, but it was soon noticed that an ample class of logics not belonging to the relevance logics family could also be characterized by this semantics. RM-semantics is a relational type semantics. It can be distinguished from standard Kripke semantics in two aspects: on the one hand, the accessibility relation between worlds (points, setups or whatever the name is preferred) is a ternary relation instead of a binary Chapter 4). In §5, a reduced RM 1 -semantics is provided for each one of the six Lt-logics and the (strong) soundness theorems are proved. In §6, the extension and primeness lemmas are noted (cf. [16] and also [6] ). In §7, we prove a series of preliminary lemmas to the completeness theorem. Finally, in §8, the (strong) completeness theorems are proved. We have added three appendices: Appendix 1, on the natural implicative expansions of MK3, and Appendices 2 and 3, on the Lt-logics.
Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix
In this section, Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix is recalled. Firstly, we state some preliminary definitions where we recall some basic notions as used in the present paper. Then, Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix is defined.
Definition 2.1 (Language)
The propositional language consists of a denumerable set of propositional variables  0   1       and the following connectives → (conditional), ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), ¬ (negation). The biconditional (↔) and the set of wffs are defined in the customary way.   etc. are metalinguistic variables.
Definition 2.2 (Logics)
A logic L is a structure (L,`L ) where L is a propositional language and`L is a (proof-theoretical) consequence relation defined on L by a set of axioms and a set of rules of derivation. The notions of 'proof ' and 'theorem' are understood as it is customary in Hilbert-style axiomatic systems (Γ`L  means that  is derivable from the set of wffs Γ in L; and`L  means that  is a theorem of L).
Definition 2.3 (Extensions and expansions)
Let L be a logic formulated with axioms a1 a and rules of derivation r1 r. A logic L 0 includes L iff a1 a are theorems of L 0 and rules r1 r are provable in L 0 . We shall generally refer to logics including L by EL-logics. Notice that an EL-logic can be an extension of L (a strengthening of L in the language of L) or an expansion of it (a strengthening of L in an expansion of the language of L). An extension
Definition 2.4 (Logical matrix) A (logical) matrix is a structure (V  F) where (1) V is a (ordered) set of (truth) values; (2)  is a non-empty proper subset of V (the set of designated values); and (3) F is the set of -ary functions on V such that for each -ary connective  (of the propositional language in question), there is a function
Definition 2.5 (M-interpretation, M-consequence, M-validity) Let M be a matrix for (a propositional language) L. An M-interpretation  is a function from F to V according to the functions in F. Then, for any set of wffs Γ and wff , Γ ² M  ( is a consequence of Γ according to M) iff () ∈  whenever
(By ² M we shall refer to the relation defined in M).
Definition 2.6 (Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix) The propositional language consists of the connectives ∧ ∨ ¬. Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix, MK3 (our label), is the structure (V  F) where (1) V = {0 1 2} and it is ordered as shown in the following diagram
where  ∧ and  ∨ are defined as the glb (or lattice meet) and the lub (or lattice joint), respectively,  ¬ is an involution with  ¬ (2) = 0  ¬ (0) = 2 and  ¬ (1) = 1. We display the tables for ∧, ∨ and ¬:
The notions of an MK3-interpretation, MK3-consequence and MK3-validity are defined according to the general Definition 2.5.
The notion of a logic determined by a given matrix can be understood as stated in the following definition. Definition 2.7 (Logics determined by matrices) Let L be a propositional language, M a matrix for L and`L a (proof theoretical) consequence relation defined on L. Then, the logic L (cf. Definition 2.2) is determined by M iff for every set of wffs Γ and wff , Γ`L  iff Γ ² M . In particular, the logic L (considered as the set of its theorems) is determined by M iff for every wff ,
The logic determined by MK3 can be named here K3 1 (only one designated value) or K3 2 (two designated values) (cf. [8] , §3.4 on these logics).
Natural implicative expansions of MK3
Following Tomova [18] , we define "natural conditionals" as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Natural conditionals) Let L be a propositional language with → among its connectives and M be a matrix for L where the values  and  represent the supremum and the infimum in V. Then, an  → -function on V defines a natural conditional if the following conditions are satisfied:
1.  → coincides with (the  → -function for) the classical conditional when restricted to the subset { } of V.
2.  → satisfies Modus ponens, that is, for any   ∈ V, if  →  ∈  and  ∈ , then  ∈ .
For any
Proposition 3.2 (Natural conditionals in 3-valued matrices) (a) Two designated values: Let L be a propositional language and M be a 3-valued matrix where V is defined exactly as in MK3 and  = {1 2}. Now, consider the 24  → functions defined in the following general table:
where
The set of functions contained in TI is the set of all natural conditionals definable in M.
(b) One designated value: Now, let M and V be as above but  = {2}. Consider the 6  → functions in the following general table:
where  ∈ {0 1 2} and  ∈ {0 1}. The set of functions contained in TII is the set of all natural conditionals definable in M.
Proof. It is obvious (cf. [14] , [15] ).
Next, the notion of a natural implicative 3-valued matrix is defined and all natural implicative expansions of MK3 are collected in Proposition 3.4. Definition 3.3 (Natural implicative 3-valued matrices) Let L be a propositional language with the connective →. And let M be a 3-valued matrix where V and  are defined as in Definition 2.6. Moreover, let  → be one of the functions (defining one of the conditionals) in TI or TII (in Proposition 3.2). Then, it is said that M is a natural implicative 3-valued matrix. (Notice that we are supposing that V is ordered as stated in Definition 2.6.) (1) Two designated values: All tables except t1, t4, t7, t10, t13, t16, t19 and t22 falsify the rule Con. On the other hand, t1, t4, t7 and t10 falsify the rule Pref; and t13 and t19 falsify the rule Suf. Thus, we are left with t16 and t22 (i.e., t5 and t6 above). (2) Only one designated value: Tables t25 and t26 falsify the rule Con. Thus, we are left with t27, t28, t29 and t30 (i.e., t1, t2, t3 and t4 above, respectively). (In case a tester is needed, the reader can use that in [9] .)
The aim of this paper is to provide a reduced RM 1 -semantics for each one of the logics determined by these six implicative expansions of MK3. In this section, we define the logics Lt1, Lt2,..., Lt6 determined by the natural implicative expansions of MK3, Mt1, Mt2,..., Mt6, verifying all axioms and rules of Sylvan and Plumwood's minimal logic B M . We will generally refer by Lt-logics to these six logics. We have tried to axiomatize the Lt-logics with a common basis as wide as possible. In this sense, the six Lt-logics are formulated as extensions of Routley and Meyer's disjunctive basic logic B, which is defined as shown in Definition 4.1 below (cf. [16] ). Axioms:
Rules of inference:
We note the following proposition. 
Thus, notice that B M is a sublogic of B (cf. [17] ), but it is important to note that B and B d are different logics. In what follows, the Lt-logics are defined. In addition to A1-A7, the following list of axioms will be used. 
Definition 4.6 (The logic b
3 ) The basic logic b 3 is the result of adding the following axioms to B d :
Definition 4.7 (The logic b 3 Ecq) The basic logic b 3 Ecq is the result of adding to b 3 the rule dEcq ("Disjunctive Ecq", where Ecq is "E contradictione quodlibet" -"Anything (follows) from a contradiction"). 
Proof. T4 is provable by B M and A8; T5 and T6, by B and A9; T7, by B and A9 in the form 
2 is axiomatized when adding the following axioms to b 3 :
We note some theorems of b 2 ) The following are provable in b 
On the other hand, T13 below is provable in b
Proof. T9, T10 and T13 are derivable by B and A16, A15 and A11, respectively; then, T11 and T12 follow by B M and A17 together with A9 and A10, respectively.
Finally, the Lt-logics can be defined. (More conspicuous formulations of these logics can be found in Appendix 3.) 
2 ) is immediate in Lt1 by B and A21 (clearly, A22, A23 or A24 can be used instead of A21 to derive A21 0 ). On the other hand, in Appendix 2, it is proved that the axiomatizations of Lt1, Lt2, Lt3, Lt4, Lt5 and Lt6 given in the present section are (deductively) equivalent (cf. Definition 2.3) to the original ones provided in [14] and [15] .
Finally, the relations these logics maintain to each other are summarized in the following diagram, where the arrow is to be read as follows. Let L, L 0 be two logics in the diagram. L→L 0 means that L is included in L 0 . More precisely, it means that, for any set of wffs Γ and wff , if Γ`L , then Γ`L0 .
On the other hand, that there are not other relations between the logics in the diagram than those recorded (and, of course, those following from the transtivity of the relation expressed by →) can be proved as follows (in case a tester is needed, the reader can use that in [9] ; we can suppose that the soundness and completeness theorems in Sections 5 and 8 have been proved).
b
3 is not included in B d : A9 and A10 are not theorems of relevant logic R.
b 3
Ecq is not included in b 
Reduced Routley-Meyer semantics for the Lt-logics
In this section a reduced Routley-Meyer semantics with a set of designated points (a reduced RM 1 -semantics) is provided for each one of the Lt-logics. Given that the Lt-logics are formulated as extensions of Routley and Meyer's disjunctive basic logic B d , we begin by presenting a reduced RM 1 -semantics for extensions of this last logic.
, is a structure with at least the following items: (a) a set  and an element of it, ; (b) a ternary relation  and a unary operation * defined on  subject at least to the following definitions and postulates for all     ∈ :
(c) a valuation relation ² from  to the set of all formulas such that the following conditions (clauses) are satisfied for every propositional variable , formulas   and  ∈ : Next, the notions of consequence and validity are defined. Then, we remark two lemmas which are useful in the soundness proofs to follow. 
Proof. From left to right (⇒) by P1; from right to left (⇐), by Lemma Proof. It can be found in [16] , Chapter 4. Definition 5.7 (Postulates corresponding to A8-A26 and dEcq) Below, we provide postulates corresponding to each one of the axioms A8-A26 and the rule dEcq (c) A17,  ∨ ¬, is true in M : Suppose that there is a wff  such that (1) Finally, once the notion of an Lt-model defined, we prove soundness of the Lt-logics. 
Extension and primeness lemmas
In this section, the extension and primeness lemmas are remarked (cf. [16] ; cf. also [6] ). These lemmas are essentially used in the completeness proofs in section 8.
An L-theory is a set of formulas closed under Adjunction (Adj) and L-entailment (L-ent). That is,  is an L-theory if whenever   ∈ , then  ∧  ∈ ; and if whenever  →  is a theorem of L and  ∈ , then  ∈ .
By the term EB d -theory, we will generally refer to any theory defined upon an EB d -logic as just indicated. The classes of EB d -theories of interest in the present paper are remarked in the following definition.
Definition 6.2 (Classes of EB
d -theories) Let L be an EB d -logic and  an L-theory. We set:
1.  is prime iff whenever  ∨  ∈ , then  ∈  or  ∈ .
2.  is empty iff it contains no formulas.
 is regular iff  contains all theorems of L.
4.  is trivial iff every formula belongs to it.
5.  is a-consistent (consistent in an absolute sense) iff  is not trivial.
6.  is n-consistent (consistent according to the standard concept of consistency) iff  ∧ ¬  ∈  for any formula .
Once the notions of Disjunctive EB d -derivability and EB d -maximal set being defined, the Extensions to maximal sets and Primeness Lemmas are proved by leaning on the Preliminary Lemma to the Extension Lemma.
Lemma 6.5 (Preliminary Lemma to the Extension Lemma) Let L be an EB d -logic with no other primitive rules than Adjunction, Modus Ponens, disjunctive Modus Ponens, disjunctive Suffixing, disjunctive Prefixing and disjunctive Contraposition or just with no other primitive rules than these ones and the rule disjunctive Ecq. Then, for formulas
Proof. Cf. [6] , p. 27 or Lemma 7.3 in [13] . 
Proof. Cf. Lemma 9 in [6] or Chapter 4 in [16] , or Lemma 7.4 in [13] .
Lemma 6.7 (Primeness) Let L be an EB d -logic with no other primitive rules than Adjunction, Modus Ponens, disjunctive Modus Ponens, disjunctive Suffixing, disjunctive Prefixing and disjunctive Contraposition or just with no other primitive rules than these ones and the rule disjunctive Ecq. If Γ is an Lmaximal set, then it is a prime L-theory closed under the rules of L.
Proof. Cf. Lemma 8 in [6] .
Preliminaries to the completeness theorems
In this section, we prove a series of preliminary lemmas to be used in the completeness proofs of the Lt-logics. As in section 6, we essentially follow the terminology and strategy of [16] , Chapter 4. Firstly, we define the notions of a fundamental EB d -theory and that of a T -theory. By the term fundamental EB d -theory (or simply, fundamental theory), we will generally refer to any theory defined upon an EB d -logic as shown in Definition 7.1.
Definition 7.2 (T -theories)
Let T be a fundamental theory. A T -theory is a set of formulas closed under Adjunction (Adj) and T -entailment (T -ent). That is,  is a T -theory if whenever   ∈ , then ∧ ∈ ; if whenever  →  ∈ T and  ∈ , then  ∈ .
It is obvious that T -theories are EB d -theories. The main notions needed in order to define the canonical model are recorded in the following definition. These notions are used for defining canonical models in section 8 (cf. Definition 8.3). Definition 7.3 (Main notions for defining canonical models) Let T be a fundamental theory and   be the set of all T -theories. Then, the ternary relation   is defined in   as follows: for all formulas   and
Next, let   be the set of all prime T -theories and   the restriction of   to   . On the other hand, let   be the set of all non-empty, a-consistent prime T -theories and *  be defined on   as follows: for all  ∈   ,  *  = { | ¬  ∈ }. Finally, the relation ²  is defined as follows: for each formula  and
In the rest of this section, we prove a series of lemmas which will be used in the completeness proofs in section 8. These lemmas are proved for Eb 3 -logics (the logic B d is not sufficiently strong). Thus, we suppose that we are given a fundamental Eb 3 -theory T upon which the items   ,   ,   , *  and ²  are defined as shown in Definition 7.3.
Lemma 7.4 (Defining
Proof. It is easy to show that  is a T -theory (use dSuf to prove that  is closed under T -ent). Next,    is immediate by definition of   . Finally,  is non-empty: let  ∈ ,  ∈ . By T4 and   ,  ∨  ∈ .
Lemma 7.5 (Extending  in    to a member in   ) Let  be a nonempty T -theory,  a non-empty and a-consistent T -theory and  an a-consistent T -theory such that   . Then, there is an a-consistent (and non-empty) prime T -theory  such that  ⊆  and   
Proof. By using the Extension Lemma or Zorn's Lemma,  is extended to a prime theory  such that  ⊆  and    (cf. [17] , pp. 309, ff.). Next, it is shown that  is a-consistent. Suppose it is not. (We use Proposition 4.8.) Let  ∈  and  be a wff belonging to neither  nor . By T6,  → [¬∨(¬ → )]. So, ¬ ∨ (¬ → ) ∈ , whence by primeness of , either (1) ¬ ∈  or (2) ¬ →  ∈ . Let us consider case 2. As  is supposed to be trivial, ¬ ∈ . But then  ∈  (  , ¬ →  ∈ , ¬ ∈  and definition of   ) contradicting our hypothesis. Let us now examine case 1. Firstly, notice that  ∧ ¬ ∈ . Next, we have for arbitrary
, contradicting the a-consistency of .
Lemma 7.6 (Extending  in    to a member in   ) Let   be nonempty T -theories and  be an a-consistent, prime T -theory such that   . Then, there is an a-consistent (and non-empty) prime T -theory  such that  ⊆  and    Proof. As in the previous lemma, it is shown that there is a prime theory  such that  ⊆  and   . Next, it is shown that  is a-consistent. Suppose it is not and let  ∈  and  be an arbitrary wff. As  is supposed to be trivial,  →  ∈ . Then,  ∈  (  ,  →  ∈ ,  ∈  and definition of   ) contradicting the a-consistency of .
Consider now the following definition.
The following lemma shows that the relation ≤  is just set inclusion between a-consistent and non-empty prime T -theories.
Proof. From left to right, it is immediate by using T1 of B d . Suppose now  ⊆  for   ∈   . Clearly   T  (cf. Definitions 6.1 and 7.2). By the hypothesis,   T , i.e.,  ≤   by Definition 7.7.
Lemma 7.9 (Extension to prime T -theories) Let  be a T -theory and  a wff such that   ∈ . Then, there is a prime T -theory  such that  ⊆  and   ∈ .
Proof. By direct application of Zorn's Lemma as in [16] , Chapter 4, pp. 310-311.
In what follows, we investigate the operation *  .
Lemma 7.10 (Primeness of * -images) Let  be a prime T -theory. Then, (1)  *  is a prime T -theory as well; (2) for any wff , ¬ ∈  *  iff   ∈ .
Proof. As there is no danger of confusion between  * in  and the canonical L-theory  *  in   , we omit the supersript  above * in this and the proofs to follow. (1)  * is closed under T -ent by Con;  * is closed under Adj by T3;  * is prime by T2. (2) By A6 and A7.
Lemma 7.11 ( *  is an operation on   ) Let  be an a-consistent and nonempty prime T -theory. Then,  * is an a-consistent and non-empty prime Ttheory as well.
Proof. By Lemma 7.10,  * is a prime T -theory. Next, it is shown that if  is a-consistent and non-empty, then  * is also a-consistent and non-empty. (1)  * is a-consistent. As  is non-empty, there is some wff  such that  ∈ . Then, ¬  ∈  * , by Lemma 7.10(2). (2)  * is non-empty. As  is a-consistent, there is some wff  such that   ∈ . Then, ¬ ∈  * by Lemma 7.10(2). 
Then,  and  are easily shown T -theories such that   . Now,   ∈  (if  ∈ , then  →  ∈  contradicting the hypothesis). Moreover,  is not empty by Lemma 7.4. Then, by Lemma 7.9, there is a (a-consistent and non-empty) prime T -theory  such that  ⊆  and   ∈ . Clearly,    (cf. Definition 7.3). Next, by using Lemma 7.5,  is extended to an a-consistent, non-empty and prime T -theory  such that  ⊆  and   . Clearly,  ∈ . Therefore, we have a-consistent and non-empty prime T -theories   such that  ∈ ,   ∈  and   , as was to be proved. Proof. Assuming the hypothesis of Proposition 8
. Next, Lemmas 6.6 and 6.7 apply and there is some fundamental L-theory T such that Γ ⊆ T (since Γ ⊆ CnΓ[L]) and   ∈ T . (Notice that T is a-consistent in addition to being fundamental.)
Leaning on this theory T , the canonical L-model is defined and Γ 2 L  is proved. Proof. The proof is similar to that provided in [16] , Chapter 4, for extensions of Routley and Meyer's basic logic B. We prove Proposition 8.4 for the postulates used above in Lemma 5.8.
(a) PA11,  or  * , is provable in the canonical Lt-model: Let  ∈   and suppose, for reductio, (1) not-   and (2) not-   * . By 1 and Definition 7.3, we have, for wffs  , (3)  →  ∈ , (4)  ∈  and (5)   ∈ ; by 2 and Definition 7.3, we get, for wffs  , (6)  →  ∈ , (7)  ∈  * and (8)   ∈ . By 3, 6, B and Definition 7.3, we have (9) ( ∨ ) → ( ∨ ) ∈ ;
Lt-model. Then, Γ 2   since T ²  Γ but T 2  , whence, by Definition 5.2, Γ 2 Lt  follows, as it was to be proved.
If Γ is the empty set, let Lt be the set of all theorems of Lt. Then, Lt 0 Lt  and we proceed similarly as above. [9] , if needed). But in [14] and [15] , it is proved that Lt 0 is determined by Mt (cf. Definition 2.7). Consequently, it follows from (a) above and this fact that Lt is also determined by Mt. Thus, Lt is deductively included in Lt 0 .
It would not be difficult to prove that the axiomatizations of the Lt-logics given above are (deductively) equivalent to the ones discussed in Appendix 2, but we do not have space to develop this point here.
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